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by By Michael Agyare Asiamah
& Dimitrios Dalaklis

Abstract
The analysis in hand is discussing how
certain relevant agencies collaborate
in the issue of Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) in order to enhance
safety and security in the (maritime)
space of Ghana in particular and
the Gulf of Guinea in general. The
purpose was to investigate Ghana’s
MDA capabilities, ascertain the current
technical and operational capacity and
to bring to the fore major challenges
that prevent effective collaboration
between those agencies, while
identifying workable solutions. This
research effort further identified the
actions/initiatives required to improve
the conduct of maritime safety and/
or security operations by the law
enforcement agencies in the country
under discussion. Conclusively worth
highlighting is that it is necessary to
increase Ghana’s maritime security
capacity by appropriately taking
advantage of the current MDA available

tools within Ghana’s maritime related
agencies and optimize performance
by establishing a framework of special
cooperation and standard operating
procedures applicable to all relevant
stakeholders.
Introduction
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is a rather
busy shipping area; it connects an
extended number of countries and also
provides a major source of revenue
for oil producing countries along its
coastline. It is located partly in the
North and partly in the South Atlantic
Ocean, along the Western and Central
African coasts with 17 coastal and 2
island states, as illustrated in Figure
1. The heavy maritime traffic within the
GoG region is associated with safety,
security and environmental challenges
to the coastal and island nations.
With an increasing number of vessels
operating in the GoG, regulatory
and law enforcement agencies are

under pressure to mitigate pressing
problems such as Illegal, Unreported,
Unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and
armed robbery as well as the trafficking
of drugs and people, and transport of
illegal goods by sea (Hoyle, 2015). The
Republic of Ghana, being the gateway
to West Africa and a new entrant in
the production of oil in commercial
quantities, has a vested interest in the
developments within the region. As
a result, there is an important role to
play in addressing maritime safety and
security issues in the GoG.
Ghana is a littoral State located in
West Africa. The country shares a
border with Togo to the East, Cote
d’Ivoire to the West, Burkina Faso to
the North and the GoG to the South.
Its coastline of 300 nautical miles (nm)
is stretching from Aflao on the East to
New Town on the West. Because of its
diverse maritime interests, Ghana has
established 12nm of Territorial Waters,
followed by 12nm of Contiguous
19
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discovery of hydrocarbon deposits
has created a different economic
environment and has become the
engine of national progress. Ghana
like any other GoG country, is faced
with increasing maritime safety and
security threats, evident among them
being piracy (Dalaklis, 2012). The
major threats mostly identified in the
maritime domain of Ghana include the
following:

Zone, resulting in a 200nm Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) (CIA, 2018)
and 350nm Continental Shelf (Daily
Graphic, 2018), in full accordance with
provision of UNCLOS , as depicted in
Figure 2. Shipping and sea-borne trade
are vital to the economic development
of the country with nearly 90% of both
imports and exports carried through
the sea lines of communication (Shou,

installations and vessels engaged
in the vibrant fishing industry as well
as tourism and other commercial
activities have created the need for
constant monitoring of the maritime
area.
This research effort, among other
things, sought answers to what
Ghana’s policies and priorities on
MDA are, what Ghana’s current MDA

Figure 2: Ghana’s maritime boundary
Source: Created by authors, as a modification from Ghanaweb.com
2017).
The territorial waters of Ghana abound
in enormous natural resources,
including fisheries, minerals and
hydrocarbon deposits. Moreover,
Ghana has become a major maritime
trading hub for West Africa in recent
years (GPHA, 2015). It is indicative
that since 2010, there has been the
issue of oil production in commercial
quantities, with several explorations
still on-going in the western part of
the EEZ. The protection of the oil
20

capabilities and assessments are,
what challenges the various maritime
stakeholders face in collaboration and
information sharing, whether adequate
training has been given to operators of
the various MDA tools, and how the
situation could be improved.
3. Ghana’s Maritime Safety
and Security Threats
Ghana’s maritime domain has changed
significantly in the last decade. The

Environmental. The effect on
the environment of the activities
associated with oil production (oil
pollution), illegal discharges from ships
as well as illegal dumping is enormous
and the necessary attention must be
given. Pollution of the environment by
the exploration/drilling of oil is mainly
in the form of oil spillage into the sea,
accidental discharges at sea and the
accidental spill process of the oil.
Finally, the dumping of toxic waste
must be included in the complete
environmental protection equation.
Fisheries. The fishing industry in
Ghana is threatened with extinction
as a result of over-fishing and IUU.
Industrial fishing vessels are not
allowed to fish in the Inshore Exclusive
Zone, which corresponds to areas from
the coastline to 6nm seaward or below
30m depth, while artisanal fishing
canoes are permitted to fish within
those areas. However, many industrial
fishing vessels simply defy this
provision, resulting in the depletion of
the fish resources. Often, IUU fishing
fleets illegally scoop-up hundreds of
millions of dollars’ worth of fish from
Ghanaian waters, a basic reason why
import restrictions were imposed on
Ghana’s fisheries products in 2012
and 2013 by the European Union (EU)
(MOFAD, 2014).
Illegal Bunkering/Crude Oil Theft.
Illegal bunkering includes the purchase
of illegally acquired or refined oil
products mostly at cheaper rates. It
is typically acquired from stolen oil
and the destruction of oil pipelines
with criminal intent for mischief or for

Piracy/Robbery at Sea. Piracy and
robbery at sea are set to be on the
rise in the GoG region at an alarming
rate (IMB, 2018), surpassing that in
the Horn of Africa. These pirates and
robbers usually target ships’ crews,
cargo and other valuables. The first
quarter of 2018 saw a string of 22
piratical attacks in the GoG region,
in the maritime domains of Ghana
(1 hijacked), Benin (2 hijacked) and
Nigeria (1 hijacked), with very high
success rates (IMB, 2018). The
number of incidences surpassed
those from all other regions in the first
quarter of 2018.
Trafficking. Ghana in 2016 was
identified among the major cocaine
transit points, with about 61% being
transported out of the country by sea
(UNODC, 2016). Drug trafficking, a
transnational crime, has an impact on
national security and is also directly
related to other types of organised
crime such as money laundering and
terrorism. Moreover, it has the potential
to corrupt state institutions and to
affect the stability of state systems and
society. Also, humans and weapons
may be trafficked through Ghanaian
waters if criminals find that these
waters are not properly secured.
2. The Yaoundé Code of
Conduct
The Code of Conduct concerning the
repression of piracy, armed robbery
against ships and illicit maritime

Code of Conduct. At the
sub-regional level, there
is the establishment of
the Regional Maritime
Security
Centre
for
Central Africa
(CRESMAC), located in
Pointe-Noire, Republic
of the Congo for the
ECCAS region. In
addition, the Regional
Maritime
Security
Figure 3: Gulf of Guinea Information Sharing Architecture Centre for West Africa
Source: Created by the authors
(CRESMAO), located
in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire
activity in West and Central Africa,
also widely known as the Yaoundé serves the ECOWAS region. The multiCode of Conduct, was adopted at the national level has a zonal approach
Yaoundé summit in Cameroon on 25 system, established to coordinate
June 2013. This regional framework is activities within the zones known as
an initiative of Economic Community Multi-National Maritime Coordination
of West African States (ECOWAS), Centres (MMCC). These centres
Economic Community of Central group states together, to pursue
African States (ECCAS), the Gulf of common maritime security interests.
Guinea Commission (GGC) and the The national level, represented by
Maritime Organisation of West and MOCs of the various representing
Central Africa (MOWCA), and contains countries, will be required to contribute
a comprehensive strategy that seeks immensely and work towards the
to counter maritime threats within the realisation of the overall aim of the
integrated maritime strategy.
GoG region (IMO, 2013).
This Code of Conduct brings signatory
states together to take appropriate
measures to combat maritime threats,
in accordance with international
standards, and also commit to
maritime information sharing among
states. It is of interest to note that
the leading pillar of the strategy is
interoperability between stakeholders
to gather timely intelligence and share
it among themselves at national or
international levels. Through that, the
various countries have developed and
operationalized Maritime Operation
Centre (MOC) for their navies and/or
coast guards, to facilitate information
sharing.
For effective monitoring and
enforcement capabilities, the InterRegional Coordination Centre (ICC)
was established at the strategic level
to implement the regional integrated
strategy for maritime safety and
security, contained in the Yaoundé

3. Agencies Concerned with
Issues of MDA in Ghana
MDA involves the interaction between
several maritime agencies confronted
with the challenge of ensuring safety
and security as well as clean and
environmentally friendly seas (Bueger,
2015). It is interesting to note that each
one of these agencies has its specific
mandate, internal bureaucracy and
organisational culture. The problems
encountered with internal red-tape
are often translated into the national
level. The maritime stakeholders
are cross-sectoral in nature. The
agencies include the Ghana Maritime
Authority (GMA), the law enforcement
agencies (Navy, Police) and other
regulatory agencies (Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Monitoring,
Control and Surveillance (MCS) unit
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
(MOFAD), Ghana Ports and Harbours
Authority (GPHA), National Security
21
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monetary gains. It also involves the
diversion of crude and refined products
by unauthorized persons at sea. When
companies continue to patronise these
cheap products, illegal bunkering has
the tendency to increase criminal
activities like piracy and armed robbery
at sea (Akah and Dalaklis, 2017). It is
against this backdrop that MT Mammy
Mary and MT Metrix 1 were both
arrested by the Ghanaian Navy when
they illegally traded oil consignment
about 5nm from Tema Harbour on 14
April 2018 (Ocloo, 2018).

MARITIME SECURITY

Coordinating
Council
(NSCC),
National
Disaster
Management
Organisation (NADMO) and Narcotics
Control Board (NACOB)).
4. Initiatives Contributing to
MDA in Ghana
Piratical attacks (including armed
robbery at sea) have been increasing
in the GoG region at an alarming rate
since 2007, with incidences exceeding
a quarter of worldwide reported attacks.
Maritime insecurity in the region
affects the transport of about 5 million
tons of oil per day, which is more than
half of Africa’s total production per day
and about 30% of the United States
of America’s oil imports (Vircoulon
and Tournier, 2014). To address the
situation, there have been a series
of political level initiatives by member
states of the region to implement a
regional strategy for the safety and
security of the maritime domain of
both West and Central Africa. For
Ghana, of particular interest was
the operationalisation of a Vessel
Traffic Monitoring Information System
(VTMIS). The main components of the
VTMIS in Ghana are Eight (8) Remote
Sensor Sites (RSS) located along the
coast of Ghana from East near Togo to
West near Cote d’Ivoire (GMA, 2014),
with all associated infrastructures
explained below:
Eight (8) Remote Sensor Sites (RSS)
located along the coast of Ghana from
East near Togo to West near Cote
d’Ivoire. The RSS are equipped with
radio communication towers, radars,
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
receivers, as well as Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) for detecting and
identifying ships and fast moving
boats. The sites are equipped
with marine radio communication
equipment i.e. MF/HF and VHF,
which complies with the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) standard
provisions for Global Maritime Safety
and Distress Systems (GMDSS)
and Long Range Identification and
Tracking (LRIT) to enable regular
22

receipt of ship reports.
Three (3) Remote Base Stations for
inland waterways located along the
River Volta.
Three (3) Area Control Centres for the
West, Central and East sectors, and
one (1) National Control Centre sited
in Accra.
There are provisions to further equip
the RSS with meteorological and
hydrological sensors. When that
equipment are integrated in the
system, it will provide local weather
data from the respective sites to the
Control Centres for broadcasting.
The data gathered from the Remote
Sites is transmitted to the Control
Centres. The VTMIS operators are
then able to display that vessel traffic
information on screens.
The Ghanaian Navy has established
its VTMIS control station at the
headquarters in Accra, with two (2)
other monitoring stations in Tema
and Takoradi respectively. The Tema
port which is operated by GPHA,
NSCC, MCS and NACOB also have
monitoring stations to monitor vessel
traffic. In addition, there are provisions
for Monitoring Station facilities to be
implemented in the Takoradi port. The
system is yet to be reconfigured for
Customs, Immigration and the Marine
Police; this will be performed after they
have all relocated to their new offices
in various locations. It is of interest to
note that a control centre can utilize
all the functionalities of the VTMIS
equipment, while monitoring centres
have limited use of functionalities like
flagging a vessel of interest.
5. Ghana’s Maritime
Operations Centres
For the Ghanaian Navy to perform
its functions well, surveillance and
intelligence gathering is pivotal. For
that reason, the US Navy in various
forms assisted the Ghanaian Navy to
set up three (3) Maritime Operation

Centres (MOCs). There is a main
national MOC located in Accra. There
are also the East MOC in Tema and
West MOC in Takoradi. Plans are in
place for two (2) additional MOCs
to be established in locations near
the borders to the East and West.
With the VTMIS framework, the
national MOC has a “control centre”
status, while the others are only
monitoring centres. The MOCs are
further equipped with the “SeaVision”
and “Time Zero” Coastal Monitoring
Systems, provided by the US Navy.
“SeaVision” is a surveillance system
that was specifically developed for the
US Navy and allied partner nations
to coordinate and track vessels of
interest around the world. “Time
Zero” coastal monitoring system is a
maritime surveillance solution that is
optimally configured for the coastal
surveillance of Ghana.
6. Vessel Monitoring Systems
(VMS)
To ensure food security and sustain
the socio-economic development of
the country, the MCS department of
MOFAD operates a Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS) to control fishing vessel
activities for the protection of Ghana’s
fishing stock. The use of this VMS
is intended to curb the problem of
overfishing, so that Ghana’s fishing
stock will not be woefully depleted.
A VMS is usually employed by
fisheries regulatory authorities for the
monitoring of position, course and
speed, including time at position, of
registered fishing vessels (Interpol,
2014). Unlike AIS, VMS data is
limited to the government agency
that installed it. All industrial fishing
trawlers in Ghana are mandated by
law to install VMS transmitters onboard. With that provision, the MCS
is able to monitor the activities of the
fishing fleet and query any suspicious
activity the vessels may engage in.
The vessels’ details are transmitted
even 72 hours after the transmitter is
tampered or destroyed by criminals at
sea so that authorities will be able to

track the vessel in all circumstances.

Ghana acknowledges the importance
of MDA in its activities; in response,
there is equipment operated by various
maritime agencies to enhance MDA
capabilities in its waters. However,
there is no formally documented
Policy on this issue. It was identified
that the lack of a comprehensive
and clear Maritime Strategy seems
to prevent agencies from effectively
cooperating. Without a maritime
strategy, which should outline the
roles and responsibilities of GMA
and other maritime agencies, there
is no guidance for these agencies,
so cooperating with other parties/
stakeholders is not mandatory to
them. It is of interest to note that
during the current research effort, it
was identified that the various systems
supporting information collection
and handling are not interoperable
because they were purchased from
different manufacturers and for
purposes independent of each other.
It was also identified that the coastal
communities and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) concerned
with maritime activities have very
little or even no knowledge about
MDA. However, every activity that
happens at sea spans from land. If
the coastal communities and local
fisher associations are effectively
involved in sharing vital information,
intelligence can be gained about illicit
maritime activities, like armed robbery
and piracy; this is essential in order to
intervenes even before these criminals
proceed toward the sea.
Unfortunately, Ghana does not
prioritize the maritime environment
as key to economic prosperity. On
the positive side, the government of
Ghana acknowledges the importance
of transportation in supporting the
productive sector of the economy.
Because of that, an Integrated
Transport Plan for Ghana was

interoperability.
Also, the current contractual clauses
are not favourable to the continuity
of operations of the surveillance
systems. Most of the contractual
agreements require the systems to
be remotely configured after minor
breakdowns, and an expert to be flown
in from abroad to fix major problems.
Constant monitoring of activities at sea
will be adversely affected when there
is any type of breakdown that takes
days or extended number of hours to
be rectified. If there is a delay in travel
arrangements or internet connection
problems, the case will even be
worsened.
Conclusion
Shipping activities within the GoG,
and especially the maritime space of
Ghana have increased significantly
since 2007, when Ghana started to
produce oil and gas in commercial
quantities. Other reasons include
expanded fishing activities, as well as
the fact that Ghanaian ports of Tema
and Takoradi serve as important transit
hubs for neighbouring land-locked
countries, especially Burkina Faso.
As a matter of fact, there have been
commensurate safety and security
issues within the maritime domain of
Ghana. To help in the surveillance
of the maritime space and enforce
maritime laws, various maritime
agencies in Ghana operate different
and unfortunately not integrated
maritime surveillance systems.
This research effort was conducted
in order to investigate the Ghanaian
MDA capabilities and to identify
the challenges in collaboration
between these maritime agencies,
policies and priorities on MDA,
current MDA capabilities, also to pinpoint surveillance operator training
requirements and finally, to suggest
ways of improvement. However, this
study was limited to maritime surface
surveillance alone; a thorough study is
further recommended encompassing
aviation, as well as under-water
activities in order to holistically mitigate
23
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7. Challenges of
Collaboration for MDA in
Ghana

developed in 2011. The plan, which
was hoped to inform the budgetary
allocation of government for the
entire transport sector, effectively
outlines policies for air, rail, road,
urban, motorised and intermediate
forms of transport. Strangely enough,
however, the plan barely touched on
maritime transport even though it is
recognized that plans are not legally
binding on agencies. However, the
significance of maritime transport for
the development and prosperity of
Ghana was emphatically recognised.
GMA admits shortages in its regulatory
capacity as well as insufficient
financial resources. There is also a
shortage of local skills and capacity in
the administration and management
of the maritime sector that suggests
the tendency to depend on foreign
technical and financial support. The
Ghanaian government admits that
the new oil and gas discovery poses
several challenges for the maritime
transport sub-sector. It has, therefore,
directed the GMA to develop regulations
and enforcement mechanisms and
procedures in good time. However,
whilst GMA is already mandated to
coordinate these activities, it faces
additional challenges caused by the
multi-agency environment in which
maritime regulation is developed and
enforced.
It was further identified that apart
from diverse national interests
spearheading collaboration through
exercises and combined training
during multinational initiatives, Ghana
maritime stakeholders on their own
do not organise any form of activity
that enhances cooperation. To say the
least, it is upsetting for these agencies,
to allow any external actor to bring
them together instead of initiating
collaborative efforts themselves. It is
only Exercise Obangame, intended
for cooperation among countries
in the GoG, which brings maritime
stakeholders in Ghana together for a
combined exercise. The GMA should
institute an “internal programme”
that helps in exercising the various
surveillance systems for enhanced

MARITIME SECURITY

safety and security problems in the
maritime space of Ghana.
The Yaoundé Code of Conduct is a
regional initiative from ECOWAS and
ECCAS to help curb piracy and armed
robbery against ships plying the route
within the GoG region. The Code
entreats interoperability between
maritime stakeholders and effective
sharing of maritime information. This
regional aim cannot be realised if
similar collaboration is not effective
at the national level. The surveillance
systems employed in Ghana have all
the needed tools, including coastal
radars, cameras, AIS receivers and
LRIT embedded for effective monitoring
of the maritime environment. However,
the major maritime agencies like
GMA, the Ghanaian Navy and MCS
unit of MOFAD operate independent
surveillance systems to monitor their
various areas of interest. Therefore,
the issue of “interoperability” and
promoting cooperation, even via a
“top-down” approach enforced by a
national policy/guideline document are
clearly standing out as priorities.
There is the perception that
collaboration between these maritime
agencies is effective. However,
case studies reviewed indicate lack
of effective cooperation between
the agencies due to the absence
of a national maritime policy. Even
combined maritime exercises that
bring the agencies together, like
Exercise Obangame Express, are
spearheaded by external actors/
interests.
An
all-encompassing
maritime policy will document clearcut roles for the maritime agencies,
with the idea of achieving the national
objective.
During the overall Master Thesis
effort,
questionnaires
were
administered to various maritime
agencies and the responses were
duly analysed. The observations
and findings have been presented
in line with the research objectives.
The findings were summarized and
necessary conclusions drawn. It was
deduced that Ghana has a satisfying
level of MDA capabilities that can
24

help to deal with safety and security
threats in its maritime domain. That
notwithstanding, there is certain room
for improvement.
In any case, technology is just a
tool to enhance maritime safety
and security, but a good level of
performance will not be achieved until
authorities take the necessary action
to show commitment and willingness
to document policies and procedures
that can help harness the potential of
technology. If the suggested remedial
actions provided are implemented,
most importantly when a national
maritime policy is documented and
sanctioned by the legislature, all the
maritime stakeholders will be bound
by law to adhere to the provisions of
that document. They will be obliged
to swiftly collaborate and ensure a
collective effort to enhance maritime
safety and security.
Recommendations
Ghana, as a littoral country, needs
an
all-encompassing
Maritime
Strategy, with an MDA policy clearly
described in that document. This
can be done when risk assessment
is carried out to ascertain the best
plan of action for each anticipated
threat, with the corresponding roles
of various maritime agencies in each
plan of action clearly stipulated. It
is recommended that authorities
expedite action in developing and
documenting strategies for effective
MDA.
Once this strategy is approved and
adopted, agencies will need to follow
the associated strategic directives
and work together to formulate
implementation
plans
through
harmonized procedures, policies,
and Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) that would be in line with the
strategy. When that is accomplished,
Interagency Working Groups could
be assembled to devise Interagency
MOCs, joint task forces and other
groups to work in a harmonized
manner to tackle maritime challenges.
No single agency can achieve success

in the domains of maritime safety and
security alone.
One way to achieve inter-agency
cooperation is to establish political
or legislative top-down inter-agency
directional approach to maritime
issues. However, it becomes
cumbersome if every issue is handled
this way, and is subject to whim or
politics in terms of which main issue
is most important. A better way is to
get all agencies together and outline
a comprehensive list of national
concerns, then work together to agree
on how to address them, with required
resources clearly allocated. Subjectmatter expert exchanges and joint
training are helpful in understanding
the structure and workings of other
agencies. In this case, the maritime
agencies could agree to a framework
outlining the biggest threats, key
shortfalls in addressing those threats
and available resources to address
them.
Prioritizing maritime issues within
government
policies
is
also
recommended. One of the most
effective measures maritime agencies
can take is to make sure that policy
decision makers understand the
importance of maritime safety and
security to the greater economy of
Ghana and the impact on the average
Ghanaian. In that stead, “maritime
oriented”
seminars
specifically
designed for the attendance of
politicians and government officials
are of high urgency and importance.
It is typical to focus more on landbased priorities because those tend
to be more pressing and affect the
day-to-day lives of citizens. Piracy, oil
spills, illegal fishing and other maritime
issues have huge negative impacts,
but may not have direct impact on
the average citizen. It is, however, the
responsibility of the maritime agencies
to communicate to government
overseers and citizens the role that
MDA and the maritime environment
play in their economic well-being.
Without this, the agencies will be
acting in isolation and will never get
the necessary resources to address

will help avoid misunderstandings
between agencies and possibly reduce
response time of Maritime Interdiction
Operations (MIO) when the need be.
A joint national maritime operations
centre, that mimics the Maritime
Multinational Coordinating Centre
of the GoG information sharing
architecture,
should
also
be
established. This centre can be
staffed with representatives from
all maritime agencies, and through
these representatives, information
sharing among the agencies could
be enhanced. Staff who work at this
centre can be posted to the MMCC and
CRESMAO in rotation. The experience
of the staff in the national centre will
be beneficial when such persons are
employed at the sub-regional and
regional maritime centres.
Furthermore, it is recommended
that certain contractual clauses
are reviewed to favour continuity of
operations of the surveillance systems.
This stems from the fact that most of
the agreements require the systems
to be remotely configured after minor

breakdowns, and an expert flown in
from abroad to fix major problems.
Instead, this arrangement could be
changed for locals to be trained, and
equipped with the proficiency to work
effectively on those systems to fix any
problem that develops on them.
Finally, another important issue for
consideration is that, there could also
be a network with fisher associations,
fishing communities and association
of fishing canoe owners created, so
that they can report any illegal activity
they sight at sea (Human Intelligence
– HUMINT). Arrangements could
be made with telecom companies
to provide a dialling short code for
easy reporting. This network could
also be complemented by certain
incentives: for example, the maritime
agencies could provide life jackets or
marine radios as reward for those who
swiftly report incidents with malicious
intents. With this arrangement, any
illicit activity that goes unnoticed by
the surveillance systems could be
identified once sighted by the fishing
canoe operators.
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the problems.
It is further recommended that
surveillance operators are trained
on information technology and cyber
security. There is the need to ensure
that people with criminal intent do not
tamper with the information exchange
within the surveillance systems. It is a
fact that system manufacturers have
certain security features in place.
Nonetheless, operators should be
trained to identify spurious activities
or any tempering with the systems,
and be able to effect repairs in order
to ensure system integrity for effective
surveillance.
It is strongly recommended to conduct
regular multi-agency exercises and
drills in order to enhance multi-agency
cooperation. Effective decision making
is based on accurate information,
transmitted in good time. Exercises
together will go a long way to improve
timely information sharing, and reduce
agencies’ response time to incidents.
This could mitigate the negative
effects of safety or security issues
in the maritime space of Ghana. It
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